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Abstract 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between gender-diverse boards and stock liquidity 
in Australia. We expect that the gender-diverse boards, with their efficient monitoring functions, 
lead to higher stock liquidity that has positive implications for market efficiency. Consistent with 
the notion, we find, using 944 Australian firms from 2008 to 2013, that boardroom gender 
diversity is significantly and positively associated with stock liquidity. Our findings are robust to 
a series of endogeneity checks and to alternative proxies for gender diversity and stock liquidity. 
Our results reject the assumption of women on the board as ‘tokens’ and also provide support to 
critical mass theory. We contribute to the global debate on the need for more women on 
corporate boards and provide comprehensive and robust evidence that suggests that having 
women on corporate boards is positively associated with one of the important characteristics of 
capital market efficiency, stock liquidity.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the effect of gender diverse boards on stock liquidity. During the 
last decade, boardroom gender diversity has received considerable attention from academic 
researchers. A large volume of empirical studies examines the ‘business case’ of gender diversity 
by focusing on the association between female directors and financial performance (Carter et al., 
2010; Carter et al., 2003; Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Wang and Clift, 2009); however, 
the results are mixed: some find evidence of beneficial effects while others report no effects, or 
even negative effects. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that female directors do not necessarily 
improve financial performance, but their presence may improve the monitoring function of the 
boards. They find that female directors are likely to serve on board monitoring committees and 
their presence improves overall board-meeting attendance. Their findings on the impact of 
female directors in exercising monitoring functions have given new dimension to the gender 
diversity literature and researchers are now providing empirical evidences beyond the financial 
performance such as agency cost (Jurkus et al., 2011), earnings quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011; 
Strydom et al., 2016), earnings management (Arun et al., 2015), informativeness of stock prices 
(Gul et al., 2011), and sustainability reporting quality (Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2016). The 
underlying objective of these studies is to classify female directors as one of the governance 
mechanisms which facilitate efficient capital market. However, when examining the effects of 
female directors on key financial decisions or parameters, the existing literature overlooks stock 
liquidity, one of the important characteristics of efficient markets.  
Stock liquidity, which refers to the ‘ease’ of converting stock into cash or vice versa, has 
become a world-wide concern since the recent global financial crisis (GFC) and continues to be a 
prominent area of research. Handa and Schwartz (1996) stress that ‘Investors want three things 
from the markets: liquidity, liquidity and liquidity’ (p. 44). Investors require compensation for 
holding an illiquid stock (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) that increases the firm’s cost of equity 
(Butler et al., 2005), and that in turn affects the firm’s value (Fang et al., 2009). Moreover, 
Chordia et al. (2008) suggest that poor stock liquidity is associated with a greater degree of 
market inefficiency. Consequently, firms strive to improve stock liquidity on account of its 
significant impact on the flow of capital and the development of the market, and seek to 
minimise conditions that impair stock liquidity (Levine and Zervos, 1996). Given the importance 
of stock liquidity in the financial markets for investors and firms, it is imperative to explore what 
determines stock liquidity. To the best of our knowledge, several studies explore other corporate 
governance mechanisms (e.g., board independence and ownership structure) as a determinant of 
stock liquidity (Ali et al., 2016; Attig et al., 2006; Chung et al., 2010) but none of them has 
exclusively examined the influence of female directors on stock liquidity. In this study, we fill 
this gap by investigating whether female directors affect stock liquidity. 
Our study is further motivated by the recent regulatory upsurge in calls to include more 
women on corporate boards in various countries, including Australia, France, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. (Lee et al., 2015).1 Specifically, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD) is calling on all boards to achieve at least 30 percent women 
directors, and urges the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 to meet this new target by the 
                                                 
1 The first country that legally initiated a gender quota in the boardroom was Norway. In 2003, Norway passed legislation which required 40 
percent of female directors by 2008. Spain followed with the same regulation, mandating 40 percent of female directors by 2015. Other European 
countries which have imposed gender quotas include France (40 percent by 2016), Italy (33.3 percent by 2015), and the Netherlands (30 percent 
by 2016) (Lee et al., 2015). 
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end of 2018 (AICD, 2015). The AICD’s Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
John Brogden, said that, “There is an undeniable case for gender diversity on boards. It is not 
only the right thing to do but the smart thing to do” (AICD, 2015). Moreover, in 2010, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council amended the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (ACGPR) to include increased reporting on gender diversity for all listed 
entities. Since then, the interest in recruiting and advancing women on boards has been 
growing.2 Overall, the role of female directors in enhancing monitoring quality of the board, the 
importance of stock liquidity in financial markets, and the recent calls for more female directors 
on boards provide an interesting setting to unveil debate on the impact of gender-diverse boards 
on stock liquidity in achieving vital objective of capital market efficiency. 
Agency theory suggest that managers are opportunistic and are likely to conceal important 
information for their self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Effective governance improves 
financial and operational transparency, thus reducing information asymmetry between insiders 
(e.g., managers and controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., investors and liquidity 
providers) that in turn improves stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010). Hillman et al. (2007) 
suggest that female directors bring novel perspectives and experiences to the boardroom, which 
improves board decision making and enhances a firm’s legitimacy (Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
Moreover, women are risk averse and less overconfident than men, which makes them cautious 
in their decision making (Bajtelsmit et al., 1999; Barber and Odean, 2001; Dowling and Aribi, 
2013). Jurkus et al. (2011) suggest that the representation of women on corporate boards reduces 
the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and thus reduces agency 
conflict. Moreover, Gul et al. (2011) suggest that female directors improve stock price 
informativeness through increased public disclosures. Accordingly, we argue that female 
directors enhance board governance mechanisms (i.e. board strength) to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems and thus improve stock liquidity. 
Our sample consists of 944 firms (4,608 firm-year observations) listed on the ASX during 
the period from 2008 to 2013. Our main proxy for boardroom gender diversity is the percentage 
of women directors. We use three different proxies for measuring stock liquidity: Amihud 
illiquidity estimate, liquidity ratio, and stock turnover. While controlling for other governance- 
and firm- specific variables, we find that the female directors are positively associated with stock 
liquidity. Our main results are significantly robust to alternative proxies for gender diversity and 
stock liquidity, as well as to endogeneity bias. As prior literature argues that having women in 
the boardroom is socially desirable and that exclusion of women is immoral (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008), our results provide economic significance by showing increased 
confidence of shareholders’ and investors’ in the inclusion of women on corporate boards.  
In further analyses, we use average differenced variables for pre- and post-gender diversity 
reform to find the impact of change in the percentage of women directors on the change in 
liquidity measures, and the results remain consistent. We also explore the critical mass theory 
and non-linear relationship. The results suggest that the presence of a single woman on the board 
can positively influence stock liquidity, while the relationship becomes stronger when there is 
                                                 
2 The ASX Corporate Governance Council adopted an “if not why not” approach in which companies are required to comply or explain with 
recommendations. Under the amendment, all listed companies are required to establish and disclose a diversity policy, measure the number of 
women in leadership positions, and set measurable objectives to achieve gender diversity. If the company does not comply with these 
recommendations, an explanation is required. According to the AICD real-time data, the percentage of women among new director appointments 
to ASX 200 boards increased from 5 percent in 2009 to an average of 43 percent as of January 2016. Women have made up 21.9 percent of ASX 
200 board seats as of January 2016, compared with only 8.3 percent in 2009. 
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more than one woman on the board. Moreover, the relationship between female directors and 
stock liquidity is not non-linear. Finally, we show that board gender diversity improves stock 
liquidity through board effectiveness.  
Our contributions to the existing literature are threefold. First, we contribute to the 
boardroom gender diversity literature. Most of the prior studies examine the link between female 
directors and financial performance (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Wang and Clift, 2009); however, our study is in line with only a few 
other studies that seek to find the impact of female directors on factors other than  financial 
performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahmed et al., 2015; Gul et al., 2011; Jurkus et al., 
2011). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide comprehensive and robust 
evidence of board gender diversity as a critical determinant of stock liquidity. The only 
exception is Loukil et al. (2015), who find no relationship between board gender diversity and 
stock liquidity. The scope of their study is limited due to inconsistency of their results when 
using different proxies of stock liquidity and the regulatory setting.3  
Second, we contribute to the corporate governance literature. Prior studies that focus on the 
relationship between corporate governance and stock liquidity have developed a user-defined 
index as a proxy measure of corporate governance quality (e.g., Chung et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, Foo and Zain (2010) use factor analyses of board independence and board 
meetings as a proxy for corporate governance quality. Despite the role of gender diversity in 
corporate governance mechanisms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011), prior studies on 
the governance–liquidity nexus do not include gender diversity as an important instrument of 
corporate governance. We extend this literature by examining the effect of gender-diverse 
boards, as one of the important governance mechanisms, on stock liquidity.  
Finally, our study is timely because gender diversity reform has resulted in significant 
changes in the board structure of many ASX companies. We find positive implications of gender 
diversity reform and suggest that women’s presence on boards is beneficial for improving stock 
liquidity. Moreover, the results from our study disavow any assumptions that women on boards 
are mere ‘tokens’, as our results suggest that the presence of even one woman on the board has 
the potential to improve stock liquidity. Thus, we support the recent calls for more women on 
ASX corporate boards. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature and 
develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design and data. Section 4 
presents the results and analyses, and Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
Agency theory posits that management is self-serving and likely to maximise their wealth at 
the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency conflict arises when managers 
disregard the interest of shareholders during the strategic decision making process. The empirical 
evidence supports a link between information asymmetry and agency conflict and suggests that 
managers tend to manipulate disclosures to maximise their personal trading in their firms’ shares 
(Noe, 1999). Moreover, management-dominated boards are likely to be involved in fraudulent 
                                                 
3 Loukil et al. (2015) examine the relationship between gender-diverse boards and stock liquidity in the French setting, where the impulse to 
increase women directors is relatively higher than in non-European countries. The urge to increase the number of women on corporate boards has 
resulted in a gender quota of 40% of women representation in French listed companies to be achieved by 2017. Unnecessary and mandatory 
gender balance may result in inefficient boards that in turn reflect poor decision making (Bøhren and Staubo, 2014). 
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reporting and abnormal accruals (Davidson et al., 2005; Farber, 2005). In such cases, a 
governance mechanism is needed that can monitor managers’ opportunistic behaviour and guard 
the rights of shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that an efficient board that is capable 
of better decision making is necessary for mitigating agency conflicts. Moreover, efficient boards 
enhance the monitoring function by improving the quality and the frequency of information 
disclosure to shareholders, which in turn reduces agency conflict (Beekes et al., 2015; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).  
Existing literature suggests that the presence of females on corporate boards is associated 
with better monitoring and efficient information environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et 
al., 2011). Likewise, Gul et al. (2008) claim that female directors demand higher levels of 
monitoring through more audit efforts as compared to their male counterparts. Nielsen and Huse 
(2010) document that female directors monitor board processes related to firm strategy and 
organizational practices and policies, which in turn improves board effectiveness in strategic 
control. Abbott et al. (2012) argue that female directors with their broader perspective enhance 
mental independence of the board that in turn reduces the tendency of groupthink in boardroom. 
They further advocate that females with their better monitoring ability improve the governance 
mechanism, and thus reduce the likelihood of financial restatement.  
Furthermore, prior literature indicates that women differ from men in leadership style by 
exercising trust and cooperation rather than command and compliance (Cohen et al., 1998; 
Trinidad and Normore, 2005). To implement this leadership style requires an extensive flow of 
information among directors and between directors and shareholders. If the information 
dissemination is inadequate between directors and shareholders, this may give rise to agency 
conflict. This normally occurs due to the opportunistic behaviour of managers, who possess 
valuable information about the company, hence increasing information asymmetry. Jurkus et al. 
(2011) suggest that gender-diverse boards are likely to reduce agency cost for the firm, and to 
align the interest of managers and shareholders. Gender-diverse boards are likely to create an 
affluent information environment and to improve stock price informativeness through more 
public disclosures (Gul et al., 2011), which in turn reduces the information asymmetry problem 
among directors, managers, and shareholders. By minimising the effect of asymmetric 
information, female directors are likely to improve earnings quality, reduce corporate opacity, 
and mitigate earnings management (Arun et al., 2015; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Upadhyay and Zeng, 
2014).  
Prior literature shows that a transparent information environment may enhance the liquidity 
of stocks (Gjerde et al., 2013; Lei et al., 2013). Stock liquidity is important as it influences 
investors’ decision making. Amihud and Mendelson (2000) suggest that firms with higher stock 
liquidity reduce the cost of raising capital, as stock liquidity provides ease of converting cash to 
an investment in the stock and vice versa. Therefore, firms seek ways to improve their stock 
liquidity. Prior literature finds that firms with better corporate governance, which reduces 
information asymmetries, are likely to have more stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010). Moreover, 
better corporate governance reduces firm-specific ambiguity, and moderation in ambiguity is 
associated with better liquidity of firms (Jiang et al., 2014). 
Hypothesis Development 
Despite the importance of reducing information asymmetry, managers through their 
opportunistic behaviour reveal less information to investors. This selective information 
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disclosure raises the concern of potential investors and may distort the stock liquidity of a firm. 
Thus, effective monitoring governance mechanisms are needed to mitigate managements’ 
opportunistic behaviour. Foo and Zain (2010) suggest that board independence and board 
diligence may reduce agency conflict through better disclosures and hence improve stock 
liquidity. However, prior literature on board independence as a monitoring mechanism and 
information disclosure is mixed. Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) suggest that board independence is 
negatively related to asymmetric information. Chen and Jaggi (2001) find that independent 
directors are positively related to the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. On the other 
hand, Matolcsy et al. (2012) find no association between board independence and firm disclosure 
practices. This non-significant and negatively significant relationship between independent 
directors and information disclosure might explain that the independent directors are always less 
informed about the operations of the company, relying on management to provide them with 
value relevant information.  
On the other hand, literature suggests that efficient and well-monitored boards are likely to 
affect stock liquidity. For example, Lei et al. (2013) have found that public companies in China 
experience higher stock liquidity if they have an efficient and well-governed board. Prior 
literature suggest that boards that meet regularly are active monitors and are more likely to 
perform their duties effectively in aligning the interest of managers and shareholders (Vafeas, 
1999). Adams and Ferreira (2009) note that the presence of women on corporate boards 
increases the attendance of other board members; thus there is more chance of better monitoring 
and active decision making. Moreover, they find that women on boards are likely to have 
membership of committees such as audit and corporate governance committees, which relate to 
transparent reporting and earnings quality. Investors also value the addition of females to boards 
because of their independent thinking and better governing characteristics (Adams et al., 2011). 
Thus, the presence of women on corporate boards is likely to reduce investor concerns by 
reducing the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and enhances board 
strength, which in turn improves stock liquidity. This reasoning leads to our hypothesis: 
H1: Women on corporate boards are positively related to stock liquidity. 
3. Research design and data 
 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
Our sample consists of 944 non-financial ASX listed firms from 2008 to 2013. The sample 
period is important for the reason that in 2010, the ASX Corporate Governance Council amended 
and included reporting on gender diversity as part of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations (ACGPR). Moreover, our sample includes large, medium and small sized 
firms, which increases the applicability of the findings to the wider economy. The data on gender 
diversity, governance variables and stock liquidity is taken from the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA), whereas financial data is extracted from the Morningstar 
database. The final sample is an unbalanced panel data set containing a total of 4,608 firm-year 
observations (944 unique firms over the period of 6 years). To eliminate the effect of extreme 
values, all the continuous variables are winsorised to the 5th and 95th percentile. 
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3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our study is stock liquidity, which is measured by three different 
proxies. The first proxy, the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ), captures the daily price impact 
of the order flow – the premium that a buyer pays or the discount that a seller concedes when 
executing a market order – that results from inventory and adverse selection costs (Amihud, 
2002). Prior studies show that ILLIQ is a reliable measure of price impact (Hasbrouck, 2009) and 
stock liquidity (Carter et al., 2010; Goyenko et al., 2009; Karolyi et al., 2012; Lesmond, 2005). 
Consistent with Amihud (2002), we measure the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) as follows: 






𝑑=1          (1) 
where |𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑖| is the absolute stock return of firm i on day d of year y,  𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑖 is the trading 
volume of firm i on day d of year y, 𝑉𝑖𝑖 is the number of days with available data for firm i in 
year y. To alleviate the impact of extreme values, we follow the literature (e.g., Brennan et al., 
2013) and take the natural logarithm of the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ). 
The second proxy of stock liquidity is the liquidity ratio (LR). Also known as the Amivest 
measure of stock liquidity, liquidity ratio (LR) captures the amount of trading volume which is 
associated with the per unit change in the share price. Prior studies, such as those by Amihud et 
al. (1997) and Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998), used liquidity ratio (LR) as a proxy of stock 
liquidity. Consistent with Amihud et al. (1997), we measure liquidity ratio (LR) as follows: 







          (2) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑑𝑖 is the daily trading volume of firm i on day d of year y,  |𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑖| is the absolute 
daily stock returns of firm i on day d of year y, 𝑉𝑖𝑖 is the number of days with available data for 
firm i in year y. 
The third liquidity proxy is the stock turnover (TO), which captures trading frequency, i.e. 
the number of times a share changes owners. Bartov and Bodnar (1996) find a relation between 
information asymmetry and trading volume. They explain that information asymmetry may 
cause a reduction in the trading volume because uninformed traders may reduce their trades in 
such shares. Consistent with Datar et al. (1998), we measure stock turnover (TO) as follows:  
𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑖𝑖
           (3) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝑖,𝑖 is the total number of shares traded for firm 𝑖 in a year 𝑦, and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the number of 
outstanding shares for firm 𝑖 in a year 𝑦. Volume data for each firm is collected on a daily basis, 
while the number of outstanding shares data is collected on a yearly basis. 
3.3. Explanatory and control variables 
The main independent variable in our study is boardroom gender diversity. Prior literature 
widely used percentage of women directors relative to total board members as a proxy of 
boardroom gender diversity (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014). Thus, consistent 
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with prior literature, we also use the percentage of women (Percofwomen) directors on the board 
as a proxy of boardroom gender diversity. 
Moreover, we control for other governance and firm related characteristics that may have an 
impact on stock liquidity. Consistent with Foo and Zain (2010) and Prommin et al. (2014), we 
have included governance variables such as proportion of independent directors on the board 
(INDDirector), absolute number of directors on the board (BSize), and the number of meetings 
held by the board in a given year (BMeeting) as well as firm characteristics such as firm size 
(FSize), leverage (LEV), return volatility (RVol), asset tangibility (ATang), share price (SPrice), 
firm age (FAge) and growth opportunities (GOpp) as control variables in this study.  
From an agency perspective, it is argued that independent directors (INDDirector) are more 
effective in monitoring and controlling opportunistic behaviour of management, and are thus 
likely to reduce agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, larger boards, due 
to the problem of free riding and increased time for decision making (coordination and 
communication cost), are less effective in monitoring managerial behavior (Jensen, 1993). We 
also control for board meetings (BMeeting) as regular board meetings improve board’s ability to 
effectively exercise its monitoring role (Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007) in mitigating 
management’s opportunistic behaviour.  
In terms of firm characteristics, we control for firm size (FSize) because large firms are in 
greater demand and attract attention from shareholders and financial analysts, which improves 
the information transparency (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Likewise, we control for leverage 
(LEV) because more levered firms exercise more transparency to mitigate the higher monitoring 
cost. We also control for return volatility (RVol) because more volatile stocks have more 
uncertainty of the cost of holding the stock, and thus such stocks have more information 
asymmetry and have wider bid–ask spread (Ho and Stoll, 1981). Since the payoffs of tangible 
assets are easy to observe, the firms with more tangible assets (ATang) are likely to have lower 
information asymmetry. To accurately capture the effect of tick-size-induced binding constraints, 
we control for the natural logarithm of the share price (SPrice). In addition to this, we control 
firm age (FAge) and growth opportunities (GOpp) because young and high growth firms are 
likely to be associated with higher information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
3.4. Model specification 
The model specification for estimating the relationship between gender diversity and stock 
liquidity is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡  +  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                    (4)  
          
Where the subscript 𝑖 denotes individual firms (𝑖 = 1,2,…,944), 𝐼 time period (t = 2008 
2009,…,2013). β and δ are vectors of coefficients on gender diversity and governance variables 
(𝑋𝑖,𝑡) and control variables ( 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)  respectively; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. We can expand 
equation 4 as follows: 
𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝑖𝐿𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑦𝑖,𝑡
=  α + 𝛽1𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑌𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝑖𝐵𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝐵𝑌𝑌𝐼𝑖𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿1𝐹𝑆𝑖𝐵𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2 𝐼𝐿𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿3𝑅𝑉𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑇𝑌𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿5𝑆𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿7𝐺𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡  + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑦𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                              (5)  
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where Stock Liquidity refers to Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ), liquidity ratio (LR), and 
stock turnover (TO). The definition and measurements of all variables are summarised in 
Appendix A. 
To test Equation 5, we employ the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) which estimates the 
time-series and cross-sectional variation of the association between gender diversity and stock 
liquidity. The standard errors are clustered by firm to control for heteroskedasticity and within-
firm correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 2009).4  
4. Results and analysis  
 
4.1. Univariate analysis and summary statistics 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 Panel A presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix of independent variables. The 
correlation coefficient of percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) with the Amihud 
illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) is negative and with the liquidity ratio (LR) and stock turnover (TO) 
is positive, suggesting that boardroom gender diversity improves stock liquidity. Prior literature 
used 0.7 as an acceptable threshold of correlation coefficient for independent variables (Liu et 
al., 2014). The magnitude of the correlation coefficient among independent variables is under 
0.7; consequently, multicollinearity may not be an issue in the multivariate analysis. Moreover, 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the explanatory variables (untabulated) are less than 
‘10’, which further confirms non-multicollinearity among independent variables.  
Table 1 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. In terms of stock liquidity, the means of Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ), liquidity 
ratio (LR), and stock turnover (TO) are -14.12, 3.97, and 0.49 respectively. Table 1 Panel B 
further shows the descriptive statistics of our main independent variable (percentage of women 
directors) and its two alternative measures (women to men ratio and presence of at least one 
woman on the board). On average, the sample firms comprise 6 percent of women directors 
(Percofwomen) and the average ratio of women directors to their counterparts (Percwomen2men) 
is 5 percent. The mean of the women dichotomous variable (Womend) is approximately 0.27, 
suggesting that 27 percent of the sample firms have at least one woman director on their board. 
In governance-related variables, average firms have 5.92 board members (BSize), of which 44 
percent are independent members (INDDirector), and they meet (BMeeting) approximately 10 
times a year. In contrast to other studies (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011), the 
average board size and board independence in our sample are relatively small. This might be 
attributable to the inclusion of medium- and small-sized firms in our sample, as these firms are 
likely to have small board size and low board independence. In terms of firm characteristics, an 
average sample firm has $1,330 Million as assets (FSize) and carries 35 percent debt in its capital 
structure. Return volatility (RVol) and asset tangibility (ATang) averages are 0.04 and 0.21 
                                                 
4 Generally, the firm fixed-effect (FE) is employed in the presence of unobserved firm fixed effects (see e.g., Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Pathan, 
2009). However, FE may not be suitable for our study because it requires significant variation in the variables to generate consistent and unbiased 
estimates. In our study, the variable of interest, i.e., boardroom gender diversity, does not vary substantially over time; therefore the FE estimates 
would be imprecise (Wooldridge, 2002: p. 286). Second, for large number of firms ‘N’ and fixed limited time ‘T’, which is the case in our study 
(944 firms over 6 years), FE provides inconsistent estimation (Baltagi, 2005: p. 13).  
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respectively. The average stock price (SPrice) is -0.89 and the average age is 15.58 years (FAge) 
with growth opportunities (GOpp) of 2.21.  
Table 1 Panel C presents the univariate analyses of firms with and without women on their 
boards. We observe a significant mean difference in all the stock liquidity measures between 
firms with and without women on board. For instance, the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) is 
significantly lower for the firms with women on boards (-15.61) than for the firms without 
women on their boards (-13.51), implying that firms with gender-diverse boards have a greater 
stock liquidity compare to all male boards. We also observe a significant mean difference in 
almost all the control variables between firms with and without women on their boards. In 
particular, compared to the firms without women on their boards, the firms with women on their 
boards have significantly larger and more independent boards that meet more often in a given 
financial year. Furthermore, we observe that firms with women on their boards are larger in size 
and older in age, have more asset tangibility, have high debt in their capital structure, have a 
higher share price, and have lower return volatility. These comparisons suggest that governance 
and firm related characteristics could influence the choices of firms in appointing women 
directors to their boards. Therefore, it is important to control for these characteristics in our 
multivariate analysis. 
Table 1 Panel D presents the sample distribution and descriptive statistics by year and 
industry. We note a gradual increase in percentage (21.81 to 34.37 percent) of firms with women 
on boards (Womend) from 2008 to 2013. Similarly, the percentage of women on boards 
(Percofwomen) steadily increases from 4.51 percent in 2008 to 7.64 percent in 2013. The 
percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) in our sample is low due to several reasons. 
First, our sample is not restricted to Top200 firms that are inclined to have more women on their 
boards due to their size and institutional pressure (Peng, 2004). Second, we exclude financial 
sector firms; a recent survey on the women in boardrooms suggests that the financial sector tops 
all industries in terms of having more women on boards (Deloitte, 2015). In terms of stock 
liquidity, however, we do not find a systematic rising trend, although we observe significant 
improvement in stock liquidity surrounding the gender diversity reform period of 2010. For 
instance, comparing the average stock liquidity of 2009 with that of 2011, we observe that the 
Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) decreased from -13.28 to -14.55, the liquidity ratio (LR) 
increased from 2.41 to 5.09 and the stock turnover (TO) increased from 0.40 to 0.54. Overall, 
these trends in gender diversity and stock liquidity suggest the necessity of year fixed effect 
(Year) in the model. 
Table 1 Panel D further provides the sample distribution and descriptive statistics by Global 
Industry Classification Scheme (GICS). Consumer discretionary (CD), consumer staples (CS), 
and health care (HC) are the top three industries in terms of having a gender-diverse board. 
Moreover, these industries are also among the top industries that have the highest percentage of 
women on boards (9.21 percent in consumer discretionary, 8.76 in consumer staples, and 8.75 in 
health care). On the other hand, the materials (M) and energy (E) sectors have the lowest 
percentage of women on boards (3.52 and 4.16 percent respectively). In terms of stock liquidity, 
we observe substantial differences across industries. For instance, the Amihud illiquidity 
estimate (ILLIQ) is lowest (-15.10) in consumer staples (CS) and is highest (-13.08) in 
information technology (IT), whereas liquidity ratio (LR) is lowest (1.97) in information 
technology and is highest in energy (5.56). These variations across industries suggest the 
necessity of industry fixed effect (Industry) in the model. 
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
4.2.1. Main results 
Table 2 provides the pooled OLS regression results of the association between gender 
diversity and stock liquidity. We estimate the relationship between stock liquidity and gender 
diversity in three different models. The first model (Model 1) presents the relationship between 
percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) and Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) while 
controlling other governance and firm related variables. The results from the first model suggest 
that gender diversity on corporate boards is significantly and negatively related to stock 
illiquidity. In Model 1, the coefficient on percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) is -
0.96, which suggests that a 1 percent increase in women on boards reduces the stock illiquidity 
by 0.96 points. The second and third models (Models 2 and 3) present the relationship of 
percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) with liquidity ratio (LR) and stock turnover (TO) 
respectively. The results from Models 2 and 3 shows that gender diversity is significantly and 
positively associated with stock liquidity. The coefficient of percentage of women on boards 
(Percofwomen) in Models 2 and 3 is 0.54 and 0.19 respectively, which suggests that a 1 percent 
increase in percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) may improve liquidity ratio (LR) and 
stock turnover (TO) by 0.54 and 0.19 points respectively. Our results have economic meaning as 
well. For instance, an increase in percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) by one 
standard deviation is likely to decrease the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) by 0.68 percent.5 
Similarly, an increase in percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) by one standard 
deviation is likely to improve liquidity ratio (LR) and stock turnover (TO) by 1.36 percent and 
3.88 percent respectively. 
 
Overall, these results are in line with our hypothesis that women on corporate boards are 
significantly and positively related to the stock liquidity. Moreover, our results support the prior 
stream of literature that advocates the importance of women on corporate boards in improving 
overall governance function (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011; Jurkus et al., 2011). 
Specifically, our results suggest that women on corporate board, through their monitoring and 
oversight ability, are likely to affect the stock liquidity of a firm. Prior literature also suggests 
that better disclosure and better alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interest are 
determinants of higher stock liquidity. Thus, our study indirectly implies that having women on 
corporate boards enhances the information environment and reduces the agency problem, which 
in turn improves stock liquidity. Additionally, our results complement prior studies that suggest 
better-governed firms are likely to have more stock liquidity (Ali et al., 2016; Chung et al., 2010; 
Foo and Zain, 2010; Prommin et al., 2014).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.2. Endogeneity and self-selection bias 
One possible concern in our regression analyses might be the issue of endogeneity, which 
assumes that female representation on corporate boards does not influence stock liquidity, and 
                                                 
5 We multiply the standard deviation of boardroom gender diversity (Percofwomen) i.e., 0.10, with the coefficient on boardroom gender diversity 
(Percofwomen) i.e., -0.96 in Model 1 of Table 2, to get -0.096. Therefore, one standard deviation increase in the boardroom gender diversity 
decreases Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) by -0.096 points. As the mean Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) is -14.12, a decrease by 0.096 
denotes a change by 0.68% of the average stock illiquidity. 
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that firms with higher stock liquidity are likely to attract more women on their boards. Moreover, 
some women may non-randomly self-select their employer, making it a choice variable, 
dependent on a variety of factors. Ignoring these important assumptions may lead to imprecise 
estimates. Consequently, to alleviate possible endogeneity (e.g., reverse causality) and self-
selection bias, we employ three techniques: lagged independent variables, two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), and propensity score matching (PSM). 
The first technique, the use of lagged independent variables, is widely acceptable in 
corporate governance literature to minimise the effect of reverse causality (e.g., Wintoki et al., 
2012). Table 3 provides the results of the association between gender diversity and stock 
liquidity by using lagged independent variables. Similar to our main results, percentage of 
women on boards (Percofwomen) is significantly and negatively related to Amihud illiquidity 
estimate (ILLIQ) and significantly and positively related to liquidity ratio (LR), while it has no 
effect on stock turnover (TO). Two out of three liquidity measures support our main results and 
subsequently confirm that female representation on corporate boards affects stock liquidity, but 
not vice versa.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In the second technique, consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009), we adopt a 2SLS 
instrumental variable approach to minimise the possible endogeneity. This approach has been 
extensively used in the prior literature to mitigate endogeneity bias such as omitted variable, 
measurement error, and reverse causality (e.g., Liu et al., 2014). This approach requires the 
creation of an exogenous variable (instrumental variable) that is correlated with the main 
independent variable and that should not have a direct relationship with the dependent variable. 
To achieve this objective, we select the passage of the gender diversity reform of 2010 as our 
instrumental variable (Jiraporn et al., 2015). We create a dummy variable, namely gender reform 
(GReform), that is equal to ‘1’ for the years from 2011 to 2013 and ‘0’ otherwise. The idea of 
using gender reform (GReform) as an instrumental variable is based on the assumption that in the 
post reform period women on boards should be higher, suggesting a strong correlation between 
women on boards and gender reform (GReform). We assume that the gender reform is correlated 
with the representation of women on corporate boards and does not have a direct relationship 
with stock liquidity.   
Table 4 Model 1 presents the results of the first-stage regression, where percentage of 
women on boards (Percofwomen) is the dependent variable.6 The coefficient of gender reform 
(GReform) is statistically significant and positive. This result suggests that gender diversity is 
considerably higher after the enactment of gender diversity reforms, proving it to be a valid 
instrument for 2SLS regression. Then in Models 2–4, we use the predicted percentage of women 
on boards (Fitted_Percofwomen) with stock liquidity measures (i.e., ILLIQ, LR, and TO).7 
Consistent with our main results, the 2SLS finds a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between female directors and Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) and a statistically 
                                                 
6 Year fixed effects are excluded from the 2SLS model because the instrumental variable, GReform, is highly 
correlated with year dummies. Furthermore, the exclusion of year dummies is consistent with the prior literature (see 
e.g., Jiraporn et al., 2015). 
7 In models 3 and 4, small value of R2 may indicate poor fitness of the models but the R2 has no statistical meaning 
in the context of 2SLS due to lack of orthogonality of regressors and the errors. Due to such issues, the R2 is not 
reported in the 2SLS model in Adams and Ferreira (2009). 
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significant and positive relationship between female directors and liquidity ratio (LR) and 
turnover (TO). These results from 2SLS regression confirm that our earlier findings are not 
driven by endogeneity.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Finally, we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to minimise the 
potential self-selection bias. PSM is a widely acceptable technique to minimise any self-selection 
bias that occurs when predictors of an outcome are themselves related to other observed or 
unobserved variables (Titus, 2007). In their study, Farrell and Hersch (2005) argue that the 
shortage of qualified women offers women the luxury of self-selection to serve on the boards of 
better performing firms. In this case, gender diversity on corporate boards may not be 
systematically associated with stock liquidity.  
Consistent with Lennox et al. (2013), we adopt a two-step PSM to check the sensitivity of 
our main results. In the first step, we use the women dummy variable (Womend), which takes the 
value ‘1’ for at least one woman on the board and ‘0’ otherwise, to distribute sample firms into 
two groups: one with women on the board (treatment firms) and the other without women on the 
board (control group). Then we use the logistic regression for women dummy (Womend) and 
governance and firm related variables to get the predicted estimates that are used as the 
propensity scores for each firm-year observation in the next step. These propensity scores are 
used in the second stage to find the matched pairs for firms with women on their boards. This 
results in 2,461 effectively matched firm-year observations. After performing the PSM 
technique, any difference in the outcome variables (i.e., ILLIQ, LR, and TO) can be attributed to 
differences in percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen) rather than to the differences in 
other variables. 
Table 5 Model 1 presents the results of the first-stage regression, where the women 
dichotomous variable (Womend) is the dependent variable. We find that the presence of at least 
one woman on the board is more frequent for firms with greater board independence 
(INDDirector), board size (BSize), firm size (FSize), and firm age (FAge). However, the presence 
of at least one woman on the board is less for firms with more board meetings (BMeeting), return 
volatility (RVol) and growth opportunities (GOpp). Models 2–4 capture the results of the second 
stage regression, and suggest that boardroom gender diversity significantly and positively affects 
stock liquidity (ILLIQ, LR, and TO). These results confirm that the variation in stock liquidity is 
attributable to the systematic difference in the presence of women on boards.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3. Further analyses and robustness checks 
 
4.3.1. Gender diversity and stock liquidity surrounding the reforms 
As the ASX Corporate Governance Council amended and included reporting on gender 
diversity as part of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ACGPR) 
in 2010, our sample allows us to analyse the effect of boardroom gender diversity on stock 
liquidity based on pre- and post-gender diversity reform periods. In doing so, we use only 
surviving firms throughout the sample period and then divide the sample period into pre- (2008 
to 2010) and post- (2011 to 2013) reforms. For analysis purposes, we calculate the average 
difference of all variables based on the pre- and post-reform periods. Table 6 presents the results 
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of the association between average differenced variables from pre- and post-gender diversity 
recommendations and stock liquidity. The results are consistent with our main results reported in 
Table 2, suggesting a statistically significant negative relationship of percentage of women on 
the board (Percofwomen) with the Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) and a statistically 
significant positive relationship with liquidity ratio (LR) and stock turnover (TO). Moreover, 
these findings suggest that the change in the level of gender diversity from pre- to post-gender 
diversity recommendations is associated with the change in stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.3.2. Critical mass theory, non-linear relationship and alternate proxies 
Proponents of critical mass theory suggest that women on boards are likely to influence the 
board decision making process when there is more than one woman on the board (Kramer et al., 
2006). Moreover, Kristie (2011) summarises the critical mass theory by suggesting that one 
woman is a ‘token’, two women is a ‘presence’, and three or more women is a ‘voice’. Thus, we 
seek to examine if the presence of more than one woman on the board improves the relationship 
between gender diversity and stock liquidity. To achieve this objective, consistent with Liu et al. 
(2014), we create three dummy variables: Womend1 (value of ‘1’ if the firm has only one woman 
on the board and ‘0’ otherwise), Womend2 (value of ‘1’ if the firm has two women on the board 
and ‘0’ otherwise), and Womend3 (value of ‘1’ if the firm has more than two women on the 
board and ‘0’ otherwise).8  
The results of critical mass theory are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The results suggest 
that the relationship between firms with only one woman on their board (Womend1) and stock 
liquidity is significant and positive, for LR and TO, but weak in magnitude; however the 
relationship improves for firms with two women on their board (Womend2) for all stock liquidity 
measures and become even stronger for firms with more than two women on their board 
(Womend3). This result provides support for the critical mass theory and suggests that, even 
though the presence of at least one woman on the board influences stock liquidity, the 
relationship becomes more significant and stronger when there is more than one woman on the 
board. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Since the presence of more than one woman on the board improves the relationship between 
gender diversity and stock liquidity, it is important to find if this relationship is linear or non-
linear in nature. To empirically check the linearity between the gender–liquidity nexus, we 
include the square term of percentage of women on boards (Percofwomen2) in the main model. 
The results in Panel B of Table 7 report that the percentage of women (Percofwomen) is 
statistically significant for LR and TO; however, the square of percentage of women 
(Percofwomen2) is not significant. This suggests that the relationship between gender diversity 
and stock liquidity is not non-linear. 
To further check the robustness of our results, we use three alternative proxies of gender 
diversity: women to men ratio (Percwomen2men), a dichotomous variable ‘1’ for the presence of 
women on corporate boards and ‘0’ otherwise (Womend), and the Blau index (Blau) developed 
by Blau (1977) (see, Harrison and Klein, 2007). Our results (untabulated) suggest that all three 
                                                 
8 The summary statistics (untabulated) show that about 20% of firms have one, 5% of firms have two, and 1% of firms have three or more women 
directors, while the remaining 76% have only male directors on their board. 
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alternative proxies of gender diversity support our main results. We also use three alternate 
proxies of stock liquidity: number of trades (Trade), number of levels (Level), and trading 
volume (Volume) (Chordia et al., 2001).9 The results (untabulated) indicate that gender diversity 
is significantly and positively related with stock liquidity (Trade, Level, and Volume). Overall, 
these findings are consistent with our main findings reported in Table 2 and confirm that our 
main results are robust after considering alternate gender diversity and stock liquidity proxies.  
4.3.3. Gender diversity, board strength and stock liquidity 
Since we posit a link between boardroom gender diversity and stock liquidity through 
effectiveness of corporate boards, we examine whether boardroom gender diversity is associated 
with the board effectiveness, and whether board effectiveness improves stock liquidity.10 To 
examine these associations, we employ a proxy for board effectiveness, i.e. the board strength 
index based on the independence of the board and its subcommittees (audit, nomination, 
remuneration). Specifically, we follow Ali et al. (2014) and construct a board strength index 
(BStrength) based on 17 governance provisions (see Appendix B). By using equally weighted 
scoring methodology, we assign the value ‘1’ if a firm meets particular criteria and ‘0’ otherwise. 
We then aggregate these individual values to construct a board strength index (range 0 to 17) 
where ‘0’ indicates the ‘weak’ board and ‘17’ indicates the ‘strong’ board. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 Model 1 presents the results on boardroom gender diversity and board strength, 
Models 2–4 show the results on board strength and stock liquidity, and Models 5–7 display the 
results on boardroom gender diversity, board strength and stock liquidity.11 The results from 
Model 1 suggest that gender diversity at board level (Percofwomen) is significantly and 
positively associated with board strength (BStrength). Results of Models 2–4 indicate that board 
strength (BStrength) is significantly and positively associated with stock liquidity (ILLIQ, LR, 
and TO). Finally, while controlling for board strength (BStrength), models 5–7 suggest women 
on corporate boards (Percofwomen) to be still significantly associated with stock liquidity 
(ILLIQ, LR, and TO). Overall, these findings suggest that women on corporate boards improve 
stock liquidity because it is related to the improvement in board effectiveness. 
5. Conclusion 
Given the proliferating attention of regulators and researchers on boardroom gender diversity 
and the pertaining gap in the gender diversity literature, our study is timely to examine the 
implications of female participation on the corporate boards. Specifically, we examine the 
influence of boardroom gender diversity on stock liquidity based on 944 ASX listed firms over 
the period from 2008 to 2013. Our results suggest that women on boards are significantly and 
positively associated with stock liquidity. These results remain consistent when we use 
alternative proxies for gender diversity and stock liquidity. To minimise possible endogeneity 
and self-selection bias, we perform a series of sensitivity tests including lagged independent 
variables, an instrumental variable approach, and the propensity score matching technique. The 
                                                 
9 The number of trades (Trade) is measured as the average number of transactions in a financial year. The number of levels (Level) is measured as 
the yearly average of the number of price levels available at a particular time in the order book. It is also referred to as the depth of the order 
book. The trading volume (Volume) is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of shares traded (in dollars) in a financial year. 
10 We thank the conference participants for suggesting this additional test. 
11 Since board independence (INDDirector) and board meetings (BMeeting) are part of the board strength index, we omit these two variables from 
the model to avoid multicollinearity. 
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results from these sophisticated tests support the notion that women on boards affect stock 
liquidity, not vice versa.  
In further analyses, we document that the change in the percentage of women on boards from 
pre- to post-gender diversity reform is associated with the change in stock liquidity. We also test 
for critical mass theory and linearity of relationship between gender-diverse boards and stock 
liquidity. We find that the presence of only one woman director is also associated with positive 
improvement in stock liquidity, while the influence become stronger in the presence of two and 
three or more women on board. These results reject the assumption of women as ‘tokens’ and 
support the critical mass theory. While examining the linearity of the relationship, we find that 
the relationship between gender-diverse boards and stock liquidity is not non-linear (i.e., not 
subject to reversal after reaching a certain point). Finally, to assess our argument of women on 
boards improve stock liquidity by increasing board strength, we examine the association between 
1) women on boards and board strength, 2) board strength and stock liquidity, and 3) women on 
boards and stock liquidity by controlling board strength. Notably, the results support our 
argument that women on boards improve stock liquidity through increasing board strength. 
Our study contributes to the current debate on the implications of having women on boards 
by providing first (to the best of our knowledge) comprehensive and robust evidence on the 
positive and significant influence of female directors on stock liquidity. Overall, these findings 
support the calls for more women on ASX boards and opens new avenues for future research in 
determining the relationship between gender-diverse boards and other characteristics of efficient 
capital market such as financial stability and insolvency risk.  
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Table 1  
Summary statistics and univariate analysis  
` Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Panel A: Correlation analysis                 
1 ILLIQ 1.00                2 LR  -0.59 1.00               3 TO -0.57 0.69 1.00              4 Percofwomen  -0.13 0.10 0.02 1.00             5 Percwomen2men  -0.20 0.17 0.06 0.90 1.00            6 Womend -0.29 0.24 0.11 0.66 0.87 1.00           7 INDDirector -0.36 0.25 0.24 0.12 0.16 0.20 1.00          8 BSize -0.45 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.24 0.38 0.19 1.00         9 BMeeting -0.13 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.22 1.00        10 FSize -0.80 0.45 0.38 0.11 0.20 0.32 0.37 0.54 0.13 1.00       11 LEV -0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.13 1.00      12 RVol 0.45 -0.07 0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 -0.05 -0.42 -0.26 1.00     13 ATang -0.32 0.21 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.05 0.36 0.25 -0.24 1.00    14 SPrice  -0.68 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.27 0.31 0.42 0.11 0.44 0.18 -0.58 0.30 1.00   15 FAge -0.03 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 1.00  16 GOpp -0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.18 0.02 0.07 -0.10 0.19 -0.08 1.00 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 Observations 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 4,608 
 Mean -14.12 3.97 0.49 0.06 0.05 0.27 0.44 5.92 10.48 1,330 0.35 0.04 0.21 -0.89 15.58 2.21 
 Median -13.61 1.31 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 6.00 10.00 76.10 0.33 0.04 0.10 -0.87 13.22 1.40 
 Std 3.05 5.79 0.47 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.25 1.94 4.40 9,430 0.25 0.02 0.23 1.98 10.44 2.24 
 Min -19.97 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -4.61 1.31 0.22 
 Max -9.49 20.22 1.60 0.33 0.80 1.00 0.83 10.00 20.00 244,000 0.90 0.08 0.71 4.79 39.87 9.19 
Panel C: Univariate analysis (T-test) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 With women director (mean) -15.61 5.94 0.57    0.52 7.16 11.07 4070 0.40 0.03 0.25 -0.01 16.49 2.15 
 Without women director (mean) -13.59 3.25 0.46    0.41 5.46 10.26 323 0.33 0.04 0.20 -1.22 15.24 2.23 
 Difference -2.02 2.69 0.11    0.11 1.70 0.80 3750 0.07 -0.01 0.05 1.21 1.25 -0.09 
Panel D: Sample distribution and descriptive statistics across years and industries            
 Year wise  Industry wise 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  E M I CD CS HC IT TS U 
 Percentage of firms with women 21.81 22.22 23.56 28.15 32.88 34.37  20.00 17.59 28.48 40.85 39.19 38.83 32.55 36.03 15.78 
 Percofwomen 4.51 4.66 5.11 6.05 7.33 7.64  4.16 3.52 5.93 9.21 8.76 8.75 7.88 7.32 4.29 
 ILLIQ (mean) -14.18 -13.28 -14.25 -14.55 -14.19 -14.22  -14.48 -13.87 -14.6 -14.47 -15.10 -13.41 -13.08 -14.41 -14.16 
 LR (mean) 3.18 2.41 4.44 5.09 4.29 4.56  5.56 4.25 3.10 3.51 5.44 3.24 1.97 4.66 4.86 
 TO (mean) 0.52 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.46  0.65 0.55 0.43 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.30 0.35 0.36 
Note: This table shows the summary statistics (correlation, descriptive, and t-test) of the independent and dependent variables. Bold texts indicate statistical significance at 1% 
level or better. FSize is taken in amount instead of natural logarithm in descriptive statistics to make it meaningful. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
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Table 2  
Gender diversity and stock liquidity (Pooled OLS regression)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variable    Percofwomen -0.96** 0.54** 0.19** 
 (-2.04) (2.18) (2.04) Governance related variables    INDDirector -0.81*** 0.65*** 0.25*** 
 (-4.64) (5.56) (6.68) BSize -0.04 0.01 -0.06** 
 (-0.33) (0.12) (-2.01) BMeeting -0.19* 0.14** 0.06*** 
 (-1.84) (2.15) (3.16) Firm related variables    FSize -1.14*** 0.98*** 0.12*** 
 (-20.08) (28.95) (11.32) LEV -0.45** 0.16 0.10** 
 (-2.18) (1.32) (2.22) RVol 28.11*** 6.63*** 9.78*** 
 (8.77) (3.00) (14.87) ATang 0.17 -0.12 -0.02 
 (0.69) (-1.02) (-0.49) SPrice 0.07 -0.74*** -0.01 
 (1.39) (-21.51) (-1.08) FAge -0.10** 0.09*** 0.03*** 
 (-1.98) (2.80) (2.86) GOpp 0.03* -0.01 -0.00 
 (1.82) (-1.07) (-1.59) Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.75*** -20.28*** -2.70*** 
 (7.27) (-34.86) (-14.00) R2 0.68 0.60 0.34 
Obs. 4,608 4,608 4,608 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
  
19 | P a g e  
 
Table 3  
Gender diversity and stock liquidity (Lagged independent variables)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variable    𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑌𝐼𝑡−1 -0.95*** 0.45*** 0.09 
 (-3.03) (2.63) (1.46) Governance related variables    𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑌𝑡−1 -0.73*** 0.67*** 0.24*** 
 (-5.53) (9.24) (8.80) 𝐵𝑆𝑖𝐵𝑌𝑡−1 0.31*** -0.04 -0.09*** 
 (2.77) (-0.75) (-4.01) 𝐵𝐵𝑌𝑌𝐼𝑖𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 -0.17** 0.08** 0.05*** 
 (-2.57) (2.12) (3.42) Firm related variables    𝐹𝑆𝑖𝐵𝑌𝑡−1 -1.13*** 0.99*** 0.17*** 
 (-33.82) (54.58) (24.60) 𝐼𝐿𝑉𝑡−1  -0.35** 0.27*** 0.08*** 
 (-2.34) (3.32) (2.62) 𝑅𝑉𝑆𝑅𝑡−1  11.11*** 9.68*** 5.70*** 
 (4.81) (7.83) (11.91) 𝐴𝑇𝑌𝐼𝐵𝑡−1  0.07 -0.11 -0.01 
 (0.52) (-1.40) (-0.53) 𝑆𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑆𝑌𝑡−1  -0.09*** -0.73*** -0.06*** 
 (-2.82) (-40.57) (-9.17) 𝐹𝐴𝐵𝑌𝑡−1  -0.06* 0.03* 0.01 
 (-1.80) (1.78) (0.64) 𝐺𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑡−1  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (-0.56) (-1.33) (0.14) Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 8.24*** -20.50*** -3.29*** 
 (11.71) (-53.03) (-22.02) R2 0.67 0.60 0.34 
Obs. 3,738 3,738 3,738 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 4  
Gender diversity and stock liquidity (Two-stage least squares)  
 First-stage  Second-stage 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables Percofwomen  ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variables      GReform 0.01***     
 (5.74)     Fitted_Percofwomen   -8.59** 12.89*** 2.94*** 
   (-2.41) (4.31) (3.25) Governance related variables      INDDirector 0.03***  -1.09*** 0.25* 0.16*** 
 (4.86)  (-6.27) (1.82) (3.87) BSize 0.05***  -0.55** -0.66*** -0.21*** 
 (9.77)  (-2.50) (-3.61) (-3.92) BMeeting -0.01***  -0.10 0.27*** 0.09*** 
 (-2.82)  (-1.44) (4.54) (5.41) Firm related variables      FSize 0.01***  -1.21*** 0.93*** 0.11*** 
 (4.34)  (-27.75) (28.42) (11.96) LEV 0.01**  -0.57*** -0.04 0.04 
 (2.03)  (-3.75) (-0.39) (1.25) RVol -0.17  32.39*** 6.64*** 9.24*** 
 (-1.57)  (12.92) (3.12) (14.32) ATang -0.01*  0.33** -0.04 -0.01 
 (-1.90)  (2.12) (-0.39) (-0.33) SPrice -0.00  0.09*** -0.75*** -0.01** 
 (-0.52)  (2.78) (-29.01) (-2.30) FAge 0.01***  -0.15*** 0.01 0.01 
 (3.19)  (-3.62) (0.51) (1.58) GOpp -0.00***  0.04*** 0.02 0.00 
 (-3.05)  (2.88) (1.53) (0.41) Year fixed effects No  No No No 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.18  9.78*** -18.54*** -2.34*** 
 (-5.49)  (9.87) (-24.72) (-10.33) R2 0.14  0.58 0.002 0.002 
Obs. 4,608  4,608 4,608 4,608 
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 5  
Gender diversity and stock liquidity (Propensity score matching)  
 First-stage Second-stage 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables Womend ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variable     Percofwomen  -1.00*** 0.71*** 0.26*** 
  (-3.05) (4.22) (4.01) Governance related variables     INDDirector 0.88*** -0.53*** 0.56*** 0.30*** 
 (4.81) (-2.73) (5.60) (7.94) BSize 2.55*** 0.02 0.16* -0.03 
 (15.55) (0.16) (1.75) (-0.86) BMeeting -0.17* -0.33*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 
 (-1.87) (-3.45) (3.21) (5.84) Firm related variables     FSize 0.19*** -1.29*** 1.07*** 0.15*** 
 (4.25) (-28.61) (46.48) (17.09) LEV 0.21 -0.19 0.15 0.07* 
 (1.03) (-0.92) (1.46) (1.72) RVol -8.24** 17.14*** 6.53*** 9.44*** 
 (-2.54) (4.65) (3.62) (13.73) ATang -0.09 1.03*** -0.44*** -0.13*** 
 (-0.47) (5.08) (-4.27) (-3.41) SPrice -0.04 0.01 -0.72*** -0.01* 
 (-0.88) (0.12) (-31.49) (-1.76) FAge 0.16*** -0.26*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 
 (3.42) (-5.06) (5.38) (5.50) GOpp -0.06** 0.06*** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (-2.67) (2.82) (-2.00) (-2.14) Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.56*** 11.05*** -22.18*** -3.28*** 
 (-10.58) (11.46) (-44.90) (-17.42) R2 0.21 0.64 0.63 0.36 
Obs. 4,608 2,502 2,502 2,502 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 6  
Regression based on average differenced variables surrounding the gender diversity reforms 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables ∆ILLIQ ∆LR ∆TO 
Gender diversity variable    ∆Percofwomen -1.02* 2.16* 0.06** 
 (-1.77) (1.71) (2.79) Governance related variables 
  ∆INDDirector -0.59** 0.57 0.13* 
 (-2.00) (0.79) (1.74) ∆BSize -0.31 0.24 0.00 
 (-1.21) (0.43) (0.09) ∆BMeeting -0.10 -0.02 0.05 
 (-0.57) (-0.06) (1.30) Firm related variables    ∆FSize -1.14*** 2.18*** 0.08*** 
 (-10.81) (8.90) (3.49) ∆LEV -1.00*** 0.37 0.14* 
 (-2.89) (0.40) (1.75) ∆RVol 29.27*** 13.69 8.06*** 
 (5.18) (1.11) (6.65) ∆ATang -0.09 1.57 -0.02 
 (-0.20) (1.16) (-0.18) ∆SPrice 0.10 -1.90*** 0.04* 
 (1.08) (-9.12) (1.85) 
∆FAge -0.017 0.181 0.01 
 (-0.09) (0.37) (0.15) 
∆GOpp 0.06* -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.84) (-0.14) (-1.09) Constant 0.10 0.78*** 0.06*** 
 (1.42) (5.12) (4.24) R2 0.44 0.20 0.17 
Obs. 663 663 663 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 7  
Critical mass theory and non-linear relationship  
 
Panel A: Critical mass theory  Panel B: Non-linear relationship 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) Dependent variables ILLIQ LR TO ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variables        Womend1 -0.08 0.62*** 0.02*     
 (-1.26) (3.68) (1.68)     Womend2 -0.56*** 3.70*** 0.10***     
 (-4.68) (12.37) (4.00)     Womend3 -0.94*** 4.54*** 0.15***     
 (-3.82) (7.63) (2.97)     Percofwomen     -0.34 0.93* 0.24* 
     (-0.57) (1.84) (1.89) Percofwomen2     -2.31 -1.28 -0.15 
     (-1.44) (-1.09) (-0.46) Governance related variables        INDDirector -0.78*** 1.59*** 0.25***  -0.81*** 0.65*** 0.25*** 
 (-6.80) (5.61) (9.91)  (-7.06) (5.58) (10.12) BSize 0.01 -0.76*** -0.07***  -0.06 0.01 -0.06*** 
 (0.19) (-3.08) (-3.56)  (-0.63) (0.07) (-3.01) BMeeting -0.20*** 0.18 0.07***  -0.20*** 0.14** 0.06*** 
 (-3.46) (1.23) (5.31)  (-3.35) (2.15) (5.20) Firm related variables        FSize -1.14*** 3.12*** 0.12***  -1.15*** 0.98*** 0.12*** 
 (-38.91) (43.47) (20.05)  (-38.96) (28.65) (20.03) LEV -0.43*** 1.43*** 0.10***  -0.45*** 0.17 0.10*** 
 (-3.36) (4.50) (3.52)  (-3.47) (1.33) (3.61) RVol 27.87*** -1.60 9.81***  27.88*** 6.58*** 9.78*** 
 (13.61) (-0.33) (22.54)  (13.58) (2.98) (22.43) ATang 0.16 0.65** -0.02  0.18 -0.12 -0.02 
 (1.28) (2.04) (-0.80)  (1.37) (-1.00) (-0.84) SPrice 0.07** -2.30*** -0.01*  0.07*** -0.74*** -0.01* 
 (2.54) (-32.55) (-1.86)  (2.59) (-21.53) (-1.87) FAge -0.10*** 0.74*** 0.03***  -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 
 (-3.34) (9.53) (4.69)  (-3.53) (2.79) (4.83) GOpp 0.03*** -0.09*** -0.01**  0.03*** -0.01 -0.01** 
 (2.76) (-2.89) (-2.50)  (2.68) (-1.06) (-2.42) Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Constant 7.60*** -58.35*** -2.67***  7.92*** -20.26*** -2.71*** 
 (12.20) (-38.24) (-19.51)  (12.67) (-34.30) (-19.74) R2 0.68 0.46 0.35  0.68 0.60 0.34 Obs. 4,608 4,608 4,608  4,608 4,608 4,608 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8  
Gender diversity, board strength and stock liquidity 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
(t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables BStrength  ILLIQ LR TO  ILLIQ LR TO 
Gender diversity variable 
Percofwomen 1.14**     
 -1.07** 0.63** 0.23** 
 (2.12) 
 
   
 (-2.21) (2.43) (2.30) 
Governance related variables 
BStrength  
 -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01***  -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
  
 (-3.18) (3.52) (4.92)  (-3.17) (3.53) (4.93) 
BSize 3.14***  0.03 -0.05 -0.09***  0.08 -0.08 -0.11*** 
 (15.72) 
 (0.18) (-0.51) (-2.80)  (0.52) (-0.84) (-3.09) 
Firm related variables 
FSize 0.87***  -1.17*** 1.01*** 0.14***  -1.16*** 1.00*** 0.13*** 
 (15.30) 
 (-19.35) (28.34) (11.08)  (-19.29) (28.03) (11.06) 
LEV 2.83***  -0.47** 0.19 0.11**  -0.45** 0.18 0.11** 
 (11.93) 
 (-2.25) (1.41) (2.29)  (-2.17) (1.34) (2.21) 
RVol -3.14  27.95*** 6.84*** 9.90***  27.71*** 7.05*** 9.97*** 
 (-0.82) 
 (8.61) (3.13) (15.09)  (8.60) (3.22) (15.19) 
ATang -0.04  0.21 -0.14 -0.03  0.20 -0.14 -0.03 
 (-0.17) 
 (0.83) (-1.09) (-0.62)  (0.77) (-1.05) (-0.59) 
SPrice 0.17***  0.08 -0.75*** -0.01  0.08 -0.75*** -0.01 
 (2.98) 
 (1.54) (-21.51) (-1.24)  (1.51) (-21.43) (-1.21) 
FAge -0.35***  -0.14** 0.11*** 0.04***  -0.13** 0.11*** 0.04*** 
 (-5.45) 
 (-2.52) (3.37) (3.49)  (-2.37) (3.26) (3.37) 
GOpp -0.30***  0.04* -0.02 -0.01*  0.03* -0.01 -0.01 
 (-11.69) 
 (1.90) (-1.31) (-1.74)  (1.78) (-1.20) (-1.64) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -11.84***  7.65*** -20.22*** -2.63***  7.42*** -20.10*** -2.58*** 
 (-6.12) 
 (6.86) (-34.16) (-12.93)  (6.70) (-33.85) (-13.00) 
R2 0.41  0.67 0.59 0.33  0.67 0.59 0.33 
Obs. 4,608  4,608 4,608 4,608  4,608 4,608 4,608 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions and/or measurements 
 
Variable name Measure 
Panel A:Stock liquidity measures 
Amihud illiquidity estimate 
(ILLIQ) 
Natural logarithm of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to trading volume 
in Australian dollars averaged over a number of trading days in the financial 
year 
Liquidity ratio (LR) Sum of daily trading volume to the sum of absolute stock return in a financial 
year 
Stock turnover (TO) Sum of daily shares traded to the number of shares outstanding in the financial 
year 
Number of trades (Trade) Average of number of transactions during the financial year 
Number of levels (Level) Average of number of levels during the financial year 
Trading volume (Volume) Total number of shares traded during the financial year 
Panel B: Gender diversity variables 
Women to board ratio 
(Percofwomen) 
The number of women directors on boards expressed as a percentage of total 
board size. 
Women to men ratio 
(Percwomen2men) 
The number of women directors on boards expressed as a percentage of men 
directors. 
Women dichotomous variable 
(Womend) 
A dichotomous variable equal to '1' if firm has at least one woman director on 
the board and '0' otherwise. 
Heterogeneous board (Blau) See equation 4 for measurement of Blau index. 
Women dummy 1 (Womend1) A dummy variable equal to '1' if firm has one woman director on the board 
and '0' otherwise. 
Women dummy 2 (Womend2) A dummy variable equal to '1' if firm has two women directors on the board 
and '0' otherwise. 
Women dummy 3 (Womend3) A dummy variable equal to '1' if firm has three or more women directors on 
the board and '0' otherwise. 
Gender reform (GReform) A dummy variable equal to ‘1’ for the years from 2011 to 2013 and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
Fitted_Percofwomen Predicted percentage of women on boards from the first stage of 2SLS. 
Percofwomen2 Square term of percentage of women on boards 
Panel C: Governance related variables 
Independent directors ratio 
(INDDirector) 
Number of independent directors on the board expressed as a percentage of 
total board size. 
Board size (BSize) Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
Board meetings (BMeeting) Natural logarithm of the number of board meetings held in a financial year. 
Board strength (BStrength) Self-constructed board strength index based on 17 provisions related to 
independence of board and its sub-committees (Appendix B).  
Panel D: Firm related variables 
Firm size (FSize) Natural logarithm of the number of outstanding shares multiplied with market 
price per share 
Leverage (LEV) Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Return volatility (RVol) Standard deviation of daily stock returns in a financial year. 
Asset tangibility (ATang) Net property, plant and equipment to total assets 
Stock price (SPrice) Natural logarithm of stock price 
Firm age (FAge) Natural logarithm of number of years firm has been listed on the ASX at the 
end of its financial year 
Growth opportunities (GOpp) Market value divided by book value of equity 
Year fixed effect (Year) Six separate dummy variables which equal either '1' or '0' for each year from 
2008 to 2013, with 2008 being the excluded year. 
Industry fixed effect (Industry) Nine separate dummy variables which equal either '1' or '0' for each industry 
(based on GICS). 
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Appendix B 
Provisions of board strength index 
 
Provisions Yes No 
 
Board of Directors  
  
A board with the majority of independent directors 1 0 
An independent chairperson; and 1 0 
Met at least six times annually 1 0 
 
Audit Committee  
  
Existence of audit committee 1 0 
With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
With a chair, who is not also the chair of the main board; 1 0 
With at least three members; 1 0 
That does not comprise the full board; and 1 0 
That meets at least four times annually. 1 0 
 
Remuneration Committee  
  
Existence of remuneration committee 1 0 
With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
With at least three members; and 1 0 
That does not comprise the full board. 1 0 
 
Nomination Committee  
  
Existence of nomination committee 1 0 
With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
With at least three members; and 1 0 
That does not comprise the full board 1 0 
Total 17 0 
 
 
